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ABSTRACT 
Rally M. Tocheva 
 
The Financial Impact of the Volcker Rule – The Prohibition of Proprietary Trading and its Effect 
on the Profitability of Systemically Important Bank Holding Companies in the United States 
 
(Under the direction of Dr. Kristin Wilson) 
 
 
The Volcker Rule, paragraph 619 of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act, ignited much 
controversy within the financial world. Specifically, it prohibited proprietary trading and hedge 
fund relationships within FDIC-insured, systemically important financial holding companies. 
Proprietary trading is the use of bank accounts and depositor funds to place trades for the benefit 
of the respective financial institution and not for the direct financial benefit of the client. Those 
who initially objected to the Volcker Rule argued that it would substantially reduce their 
profitability through diminished market liquidity and investment opportunities. My research 
explores whether this hypothesis is true. Through time-series analysis of balance sheets, income 
statements, and Bank Holding Company Performance Reports, I investigate whether the full 
implementation of the Volcker Rule on July 21, 2015 substantially impacted the profitability of 
big banks through the end of 2016, and how the Volcker Rule caused a differential impact among 
these banks. The top five bank holding companies by assets examined are JP Morgan Chase, 
Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Citigroup, and Goldman Sachs. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction  
Through the excessive risk-taking in the financial markets, the economic crisis of 2008 
presented over-leveraged capital structures in United States-based banks and financial 
institutions. Consequently, high-risk sub-prime mortgage-backed securities, coupled with the 
FDIC insured bank holding companies’ speculative proprietary trading, left the financial system 
unable to secure and lend credit. Thereby, the devaluation and inevitable collapse of these 
government-backed banks shifted the burden of capital loss to the U.S. taxpayers, whose deposits 
helped secure the federal government’s bailout of the failed banks. As such, the monetary losses 
assumed by the United States economy charged Congress with the crafting of more far-reaching 
regulatory oversight, protecting the American consumer from continued financial loss. In 
response to the financial crisis, on July 21, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into effect the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (commonly referred to as “Dodd-
Frank”), which brought the most significant changes to financial regulation since the reactionary 
era following the Great Depression. The Dodd-Frank Act sought to decrease and manage 
systemic risk in the financial system through the establishment and reorganization of financial 
regulatory agencies, together with the creation of new financial regulation. Within Dodd-Frank 
lies the Volcker Rule, one of the most controversial and publicly debated paragraphs of the law 
(12 U.S.C § 1851). 
The Volcker Rule prohibits proprietary trading within large bank holding companies 
insured by the FDIC. Proprietary trading, defined in more detail in a subsequent section, 
  
 
2 
encompasses any trade that is made using the bank holding company’s capital for the profit of the 
firm as opposed to its clients’ financial benefit. The FDIC-insured deposits partly comprise each 
bank holding company’s capital base, depending on their respective capital structures. 
Considering that these deposits are a liability to each financial institution, the bank’s debtholders 
– the everyday American consumers – are at risk for financial loss when banks take on excessive 
risk with these funds. On an aggregate level, this results in more speculative trading activity 
within capital markets. Therefore, under the assumption that proprietary trading poses a risk to 
capital markets, the Volcker Rule aligns with the central purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act to 
stabilize the United States financial system and reduce its systemic risk. The five regulatory 
agencies responsible for enacting the law – the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) – issued the final rule on December 10, 2013, following 
multiple rounds of public comment period extensions. 
The current literature and public opinion about the Volcker Rule is contradictory and 
controversial (Baxter 2012). That is, the reactions to the law’s initial announcement were mixed, 
varying between support and resistance. Through my research, the literature examined presented 
professional opinions of the rule and its soundness. While both regulators and finance 
professionals agree that the Volcker Rule is not the most functional piece of legislation due to its 
unclear definitions of terminology, they take different stances regarding the necessity for a 
tightening of proprietary trading. On one hand, regulators responsible for its enactment argue that 
the Volcker Rule ultimately provides a benefit to financial markets, as it is effective and 
successful in reducing systemic risk and protecting the overall financial system from a collapse 
similar to the that of 2008. They claim that the separation of commercial and investment banking 
activity under the same entity is integral to protecting depositors’ funds from being 
misappropriated to protect and benefit the “big bank” balance sheets.  
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Conversely, opponents of the regulation argue that the trading limitation will ultimately 
harm the financial system by reducing bank profitability, imposing a greater cost than benefit to 
the American financial system. Through this lens of critics, bank accounts will be adversely 
impacted by the trading restriction (Duffie 2012). This reduction in bank profits would stem from 
a decline in market liquidity which the Volcker Rule will inevitably cause. Lack of market 
liquidity would dry up investing opportunities within the markets, harming the overall financial 
system and impeding its functionality. Opponents of the Volcker Rule assert that market making 
– which is not easily distinguishable from proprietary trading, but legal under Dodd-Frank – is 
essential in creating capital market liquidity and stimulating activity within financial markets. 
Thus, overly-restrictive legislation, coupled with unclear guidelines in the text of the Volcker 
Rule, would hinder the banks’ ability to create capital market liquidity. The opposition to the 
Volcker Rule was wide-spread among bankers upon the rule’s announcement in 2011. Banks 
pushed back aggressively against the legislation by attempting to halt the Dodd-Frank Act and 
repealed to weaken the rule’s restrictions while the act was still in the writing stage (Dymski 
2011). 
Through my research, I explore the financial impact of the Volcker Rule on the top five 
systemically important financial institution by asset size: JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America 
Corporation, The Goldman Sachs Group, Citigroup, and Wells Fargo & Company. More 
specifically, my study measures the rule’s impact on the profitability measures of these firms, 
defined by return on assets, between 2013 and 2016. I have selected these financial institutions 
because they produce most of the systemic risk in the United States financial system (Acharya et 
al. 2010). Therefore, in theory, the Volcker Rule’s effort to reduce systemic risk should have a 
measurable financial effect on the specific trading activity, trading revenue, and return on assets 
of these banks. (More detailed information on metrics is provided in the Methodology section.)  
In addition, through the bank holding companies’ diversified focus, the Volcker Rule 
should have a differential impact on their relative profitability. In other words, those banks 
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relying more heavily on trading as a source of revenue should be more affected by the regulation. 
Upon initial announcement of the new proprietary trading regulation, Morgan Stanley analyst 
Betsy Graseck presumed that “Goldman Sachs would be most affected by the new rules” (Patel 
2013). Graseck implied that Goldman’s reliance on trading would make the company the most 
vulnerable to the Volcker Rule. As a subsequent analysis to the examination of profitability, I 
explore and find the differential impact of the Volcker Rule on the financial institutions 
throughout all metrics observed in the research study. 
I review literature that generally defines, breaks down, and analyzes the Volcker Rule, 
articles and white papers that posit specific implications of the regulation on these bank holding 
companies, and the banks’ consolidated reports of income for financial information that 
represents profitability. Research exists that suggests the Volcker Rule’s impact on the banking 
world would be both positive and negative. The specific research studies and papers that are cited 
in my work occurred around the announcement of the Volcker Rule and posit potential costs and 
benefits that would occur as a result of the rule’s implementation. However, from the literature I 
examined in the scope of this study, no papers conclude definitively the rule’s financial impact, 
and whether or not if affects bank profitability from the date of its full implementation through 
the end of 2016. Thus, after conducting my research of consolidated financial statements reported 
by the aforementioned banks, I state that the Volcker Rule has not negatively impacted the 
profitability of the top five systemically important United States financial institutions, effectively 
filling the gap in current literature. 
 
The Volcker Rule 
The Volcker Rule – named after its champion and creator, former Federal Reserve 
Chairman Paul Volcker – is paragraph 619 from the Dodd-Frank Consumer and Protection Act of 
2010 (12 U.S.C § 1851). The paragraph puts forth several restrictions on taking equity, 
ownership, or sponsorship in hedge funds and private equity funds. Most importantly, the Volcker 
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Rule prohibits proprietary trading within large FDIC-insured financial holding companies in the 
United States. The rule also applies to the United States-based branches of banks domiciled in 
foreign nations (12 U.S.C § 1851). The Volcker Rule is argued to be a Glass-Steagall type of 
legislation as it aims to separate commercial banking activities from investment banking activities 
(Uchitelle 2010). Commercial banking activities entail extending loans, mortgages, and credit, 
just as a retail branch functions, while investment banking activities focus on utilizing capital 
markets to create profits for clients. Proprietary trading exemplifies the latter by creating value 
for the investor through certain trades. More specifically, Senator Christopher Dodd has described 
the Volcker legislation as a “compromise between the formal separation of investment and 
commercial banking activities enforced by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 and the liberalization 
of affiliations between depository institutions and other financial companies under the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act of 1999” (Dombalagian 2013). The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, otherwise known 
as the Financial Modernization Act of 1999, broke down barriers between different kinds of 
financial institutions (Janger 2001), effectively deregulating the financial industry. In other 
words, the Volcker Rule aims to reinstate the segregation of these activities while still taking into 
consideration the functionality and characteristics of modern financial markets.  
The text of the Volcker Rule defines explicitly proprietary trading as  
“engaging as a principal for the trading account of a banking organization or 
supervised nonbank financial company in any transaction to purchase or sell, or other-
wise acquire or dispose of any security, any derivative, any contract of sale of a 
commodity for future delivery, or any option on such security, derivative, or contract” 
(12 U.S.C § 1851). 
  
Put simply, proprietary trading involves a banking entity engaging in trades “as the principal in 
order to profit from short-term price movements” (Financial Stability Oversight Council 2011). 
One of the concerns surrounding the financial crisis of 2008 regarded large banks placing 
speculative trades with depositors’ money, and the Volcker Rule seeks to combat exactly this. 
The rule resulted after the financial crisis exposed how much leverage systemically important 
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financial institutions were assuming to maximize profitability, as well as, how much unjustified 
risk they were taking in the interest of bank profit. 
The legislation includes certain exemptions that allow trading desks to execute trades 
which are technically categorized as proprietary trading. First, the Volcker Rule omits trading 
transactions in government securities from the restriction. The rule also permits trading in 
connection with underwriting or market-making, “to the extent that either does not exceed near 
term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties” (12 U.S.C § 1851). This partially mitigates 
the extremity of the rule and mediates the controversy between the regulators and the bankers. 
Nonetheless, the rhetoric in the legislation itself allows for a subjective interpretation of this 
specific exemption, as proprietary trading and market-making are often difficult to distinguish 
and vary among different types of securities and trading desks. Further, the aforementioned 
“reasonably expected near term demand of clients, customers, and counterparties” – a stipulation 
in the text of the Volcker Rule labeled “RENTD” by banks – is difficult to determine and is 
subjective from bank to bank (Facini 2016). This further challenges bank holding companies to 
differentiate between trades which exceed this demand (and consequently violate the law) and 
those which would be cleared by regulators. To ensure regulatory compliance, banks employ a 
conservative approach when trading. Thus, the subjective nature of the clauses in the Volcker 
Rule not only fails to provide a clear direction for banks to follow, but acts as an unnecessary 
restrictor on trading activity and ultimately, profitability. 
Financial regulators added the aforementioned exemptions to the text of the Volcker Rule 
after a mandatory public comment period following the rule’s initial announcement in July of 
2010. The public comment period allowed any person or entity from the public to write a letter to 
the Federal Reserve Board, expressing concerns with the rule and proposing justified revisions. 
This is common procedure in the law-making process and aids in creating more appropriate and 
functional regulation. Due to heightened controversy surrounding the Volcker Rule and its 
complexity, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the OCC, the SEC, the CFTC, and 
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FDIC extended the public comment period multiple times. The full compliance deadline was also 
extended various times until the Volcker Rule’s final enactment on July 21, 2015. The numerous 
extensions exemplify the heightened controversy the Volcker Rule has caused and banks’ 
resistance to comply. Regardless, discontent with the Volcker Rule remains between regulators 
and bankers today, as the latter are still not fully pleased with the restriction of proprietary 
trading. 
 The Volcker Rule has created much controversy within the world of financial regulation, 
accompanied by resistance from bank holding companies to comply. Through its restriction of 
proprietary trading, it aims to reduce systemic risk within the American financial system. This 
perceived reduction in risk is the main benefit that regulators reference when supporting the 
legislation. However, on the other hand, opponents to the Volcker Rule cite the potential costs to 
overall bank profitability through a reduction in capital market liquidity when expressing their 
discontent, arguing that the cost to the financial system outweighs any potential benefits. 
 
Potential Perceived Benefits of the Volcker Rule 
The primary objective of the Volcker Rule, consistent with the overarching Dodd-Frank 
Act, is to reduce and manage systemic risk in the American financial system. This prospective 
reduction in systemic risk is naturally the primary benefit of the Volcker Rule’s restriction of 
proprietary trading. Regulators, such as Paul Volcker, and several academics discussed below 
argue that its specific clauses effectively reduce systemic risk. Through a regulatory lens, the 
management of systemic risk in the financial markets is more important than the profitability of 
large bank holding companies. 
Former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker championed the Volcker Rule and its 
implementation. He argued that banks were no longer acting like banks when they used depositor 
dollars to execute proprietary trades (and realize profit) for their own accounts. Proprietary 
trading is also prominent in smaller, alternative investment firms, such as hedge funds, that are 
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less regulated. “Shadow banking” refers to this set of financial institutions that act as bank-like 
intermediaries but are not regulated as such (The Economist 2016). Claiming that the size of the 
shadow banking system was roughly the size of the traditional banking system, Paul Volcker 
believed that it evolved to “circumvent existing regulations” (Acharya et al. 2010). (Hedge funds 
and private equity funds fall under the umbrella of shadow banking, relationships with which are 
prohibited by the Volcker Rule.) Thus, he proposed the Volcker Rule within the Dodd-Frank Act 
to reform financial giants. Today, he continues to dispute claims that the legislation is responsible 
for a drop in market liquidity (Creighton 2016). Paul Volcker also contends that the accusations 
of the rule reducing liquidity in the market are motivated by traders’ self-interest: “liquidity is in 
the mind of the beholder. When you’re trading, you want a lot of liquidity, but if you have a lot of 
liquidity, it generates a lot of trade and you get a lot of risk-taking” (Creighton 2016). In other 
words, he argues that the traders who oppose the Volcker Rule are doing so simply to benefit 
themselves, not the overall financial system. And, they should have the soundness of the greater 
financial system in mind when conducting business activities. 
Additionally, the Volcker Rule does make sense economically considering that it is a 
restriction on certain assets holdings that are considered risky. Matthew Richardson, a professor 
of Applied Economics at NYU’s Stern School of Business, argues exactly this in his white paper. 
Richardson believes that this type of financial regulation would result in “firms organically 
choosing to be less leveraged and holding less risky asset positions” through the firms’ 
internalization of systemic risk (Richardson 2012). He explains why capital requirements alone 
are not sufficient in restricting risky trading and speculative positions by big banks and argues 
that two actions should be taken simultaneously: capital requirements to decrease leverage and 
“restrictions on asset holdings” (pg. 4). The Volcker Rule embodies such a restriction on asset 
holdings. Richardson states that the reason for capital requirements is protection against large 
losses from trading activities. However, these activities typically “produce small gains with a 
high probability against large losses with a low probability” (pg. 4). Consequently, regulators act 
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conservatively and make the required capital requirements large enough to cover the large losses, 
which occur in the case of aggregate risk. Herein lies the inefficiency from this type of protection 
against large financial losses: losses of such scale are so unlikely that the corresponding capital 
requirements seem unnecessary and overly restrictive. Thus, Richardson argues that loosening 
excessive capital requirements, while simultaneously strengthening the Volcker Rule restriction 
on asset holdings, would result in a more effective approach to mitigating systemic risk. 
 
Potential Perceived Costs of the Volcker Rule 
Conversely, a strict implementation of the Volcker Rule could have financial costs to 
large bank holding companies and financial institutions, as argued by those who heavily contest 
the rule. Most importantly, opponents to the Volcker Rule argue that the regulation could cause a 
decrease in their overall profitability, measured by the most common metric: return on assets. 
Through reduced market liquidity, investment opportunities would dry up within financial 
markets, making conducting business more expensive. An increase in transaction costs would 
translate into lower profitability for the banks facilitating the transactions. From this vantage 
point of the public debate, the potential costs to the financial system outweigh the potential 
benefits that a reduction in systemic risk would provide. 
In addition, due to compliance expenses, an ineffective internal implementation program 
could prove to be unnecessarily costly to bank holding companies. Higher costs would harm bank 
profitability. Both defendants and opponents of the Volcker Rule generally agree on one central 
point: the legislation’s ambiguity and lack of definition deems it fundamentally unclear, making it 
difficult to define regulatory standards. This lack of clarity allows for discrepancy in 
interpretation, in addition to disagreement over rule-making by each financial holding company 
to which it applies. The disparity, in turn, could result in diverging and ineffective internal 
compliance programs among the affected banks, which the regulation mandates be adopted by 
each relevant financial holding company.  
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Many professionals in the finance industry, as well as several academics, disagree with 
the implementation of the Volcker Rule. Citing a perceived decrease in profits, banks resisted full 
implementation of the regulation in its original form and text. The decline in profits would result 
from an overly restrictive implementation. As stated before, in order to be fully compliant and 
ensure against violating the law, financial institutions act conservatively when applying Volcker 
Rule guidelines in their trading activities. The legislation’s ambiguous rhetoric causes this 
conservative approach. 
Most authors of the literature reviewed in the scope of this study argue that the Volcker 
Rule’s shortcomings stem from the lack of clarity in the legislation’s definitions of terminology. 
Proprietary trading and market making exemplify this confusion, and the difference between 
proprietary trading and market making is the most important distinction to make when placing 
trades (Facini 2016). In the text of the Volcker Rule, the vague explanation of the two terms 
demonstrates ambiguous and misrepresentative definitions. For example, the legislation defines 
market making “based primarily in the literal text of the statute and the business practices of 
market makers in organized markets, without drawing upon their experience with the regulation 
of market making or the specific market structure for any particular class of financial instruments 
to define market making qualitatively” (Dombalagian 2013). That is, the agencies have not 
tailored the definition of market making to the variety of financial markets to which it applies. 
This claim also typifies the partition between the regulators and the bankers. Considering that the 
regulatory agencies are not subject matter experts in securities markets, they do not employ a 
trader’s perspective as to how the legislation will effectively impact financial markets when 
drafting legislation. Put simply, they think and write like lawyers, not like bankers, and define 
terminology in slightly, albeit significantly, different ways than bankers would. Under the 
assumption that the shortcomings of the rule reduce market liquidity through conservative 
trading, the Volcker Rule would cause a reduction in investment opportunity and bank 
profitability. 
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Further, the regulatory agencies fail to anticipate the evolving definition of market 
making in the text of the Volcker Rule. Dombalagian claims that the market makers who provide 
liquidity to investors must evolve with their clients’ needs and demands (pg. 475). Rex Chatterjee 
agrees with this point, claiming that the reliance on current definitions “renders it [the Volcker 
Rule] ineffective,” and that a “new solution is needed to adequately regulate proprietary trading” 
(Chatterjee 2011). These unclear and unprogressive definitions, coupled with the blurred line that 
separates proprietary trading and market making, could result in an overly-stringent 
implementation which harms financial markets and the profitability of the large financial 
institutions who are big players in financial markets.  
However, Dombalagian does not take an extremist perspective by simply pushing for the 
Volcker Rule’s repeal. Rather, he proposes an alternative rule, which bridges the gap between the 
two diverging opinions of the Volcker Rule. He posits that the United States banking industry 
needs a Volcker Rule “which balances the statutory mandate to promote the safety and soundness 
of U.S. banking organizations with the significant role that bank-affiliated dealers currently play 
as providers of liquidity in over-the-counter markets” (Dombalagian 2013). He argues that less 
stringent restrictions would be ultimately more beneficial to the market players, their customers, 
and those who would be affected by the systemic risk involved. His argument confirms the notion 
that the potential benefit of reducing systemic risk does not outweigh the cost caused by the 
Volcker regulation. Dombalagian further claims that such an implementation could be integral to 
the vitality and longevity of not only financial market functionality, but the Volcker Rule itself. 
Reduced liquidity within U.S. financial markets is central concern cited as a potential 
cost of the Volcker Rule. In a report by the U.S. Chamber’s Center for Capital Market 
Competitiveness, Dr. Thakor, a professor of Finance at Washington University in St. Louis, 
displays the potential economic consequences of the Volcker Rule. He posits that the rule will 
result in decreased liquidity and examines the economy through such an assumption – a common 
notion among much of the reviewed literature on the topic. More specifically, Thakor shows that, 
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with diminished liquidity within financial markets, the network effects in the capital markets and 
financial services industry would shrink as well (Thakor 2012). Shrinking network effects imply 
less efficient and less valuable financial institutions, essentially destroying the demand for their 
services. And, without demand for the services of financial institutions, revenues would be lost, 
and their profitability would decrease significantly.  
In addition to reduced market liquidity as it relates to bank profitability, a balance sheet 
impact is likely as a result of the Volcker Rule’s implementation. Dr. Thakor continues to 
comment on this impact of the Volcker Rule on systemically important financial institutions. Dr. 
Thakor argues that the Volcker Rule inadequately manages risk, and in fact, makes the financial 
system more vulnerable to collapse due to proprietary trading. He posits that, under the 
assumption that market liquidity will be reduced due to trading restrictions, bank holding 
companies will be forced to hold more cash on their balance sheets in the event of necessary 
liquidity (pg. 23-24). Holding large quantities of cash would make bank holding companies more 
vulnerable to large losses in times of financial distress.  
 
Conclusion 
The Volcker Rule has ignited a great deal of controversy within the financial services 
industry. Defenders of the rule argue for its effectiveness in reducing systemic risk and ensuring 
that large bank holding companies are not placing speculative trades with FDIC-insured funds, 
the key and most important expected benefit of the regulation once enacted. On the other hand, 
opponents claim that the regulation would pose a greater cost to the financial market than it 
would a potential benefit. The Volcker Rule is argued to be overly restrictive regulation that 
would harm the profitability of large, systemically important financial institutions through a 
reduction in trading market liquidity. While arguments both for and against the Volcker Rule 
exist, the opposition to the rule is much more prolific than its support in the literature reviewed in 
this study. That is, more of the participants in the public discourse surrounding the Volcker Rule 
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argue that the perceived costs of its implementation outweigh the potential benefits. This 
inequality stems from the ambiguous nature of the rule in regards to its definitions, coupled with 
trader frustration with stricter regulation. The difficulty of measuring systemic risk further affects 
the diversified reactions to the Volcker Rule; in other words, it is easier to measure the costs the 
regulation would cause by restricting big banks from proprietary trading than it is to prove 
whether or not the potential reduction in systemic risk achieved by the Volcker Rule has 
prevented a hypothetical financial collapse. For this reason, the resistance to the regulation is 
more prominent than its support. 
After the initial announcement of the Volcker Rule, and before its full implementation on 
July 21, 2015, financial analysts and academics hypothesized a decrease in trading revenue and 
subsequently, profitability. Modification in the types (and amounts) of certain assets bank holding 
companies keep on their balance sheets was also predicted. Dr. Anjan Thakor specifically posited 
that the prohibition of proprietary trading would harm bank profits through an inevitable 
reduction in market liquidity, effectively forcing companies to keep more cash on hand to remain 
liquid. However, since full compliance by large financial holding companies, little to no research 
exists that demonstrates whether these predictions have been realized.  
Among the literature I studied in the scope of this research, no papers have concluded 
whether the Volcker Rule has proved to be costly to large FDIC-insured financial institutions. 
Consequently, through my research study, I determine whether or not the Volcker Rule’s 
prohibition on proprietary trading has considerably impacted the performance of large bank 
holding companies in the United States. This analysis is conducted primarily through examining 
any changes in profitability, measured by return on assets, of the sample section of banks over the 
selected period. Through this analysis, I either confirm or disprove the postulations set forth by 
academics and financial analysts. Additionally, as a secondary analysis, I examine the differential 
impact of the Volcker Rule on the sample section of bank holding companies. I state how the 
Volcker Rule causes a diverging effect in Wells Fargo and Goldman Sachs, considering their 
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main business focus lies in commercial banking and investment banking, respectively. Therefore, 
my research analysis effectively fills the gap in existing literature and contributes to the current 
discourse regarding the Volcker Rule’s perceived costs or benefits to the American financial 
system. 
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
In this section, I describe the methodology I used to gather, analyze, and present my 
research on the financial impact of the Volcker Rule. More specifically, I examine on a technical 
level whether a significant change in profitability occurred within the U.S. financial market, 
defined by five systemically important financial institutions, as a result of the legislation’s 
implementation. Subsequently, if a change did occur, I look for a differential impact on the 
Volcker Rule on the selected bank holding companies. First, I state and justify the sample section 
of financial institutions I chose for my research study. Then, I describe the design of my research, 
in addition to how I gathered and analyzed the data necessary for effective execution. Finally, the 
Metrics section serves to describe in detail how I analyzed important financial metrics which 
define profitability within banks. 
 
Sample Financial Institutions 
The Volcker Rule – paragraph 619 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Consumer and 
Protection Act – prohibits proprietary trading in large, FDIC-insured financial holding companies 
with total net assets exceeding $10 billion (12 U.S.C § 1851).  The Volcker Rule defines 
proprietary trading as trading securities for the financial benefit of the bank which partakes in the 
trading, using the bank’s profits, as opposed to the near-term demand and financial gain of its 
clients.  
To appropriately analyze the impact of the Volcker regulation on the bank holding 
companies fundamental to the capital markets in the United States, I first determined which 
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financial institutions classified as systemically important. Because the mission of the Volcker 
Rule is to reduce systemic risk within capital markets, I ensured that the group of banks analyzed 
were categorized as such. The Financial Stability Board (FSB) first developed the list of global 
systemically important banks (G-SIBs) in 2009, following the 2007-2008 financial crisis, as a 
method to protect global financial markets from collapsing in the event of another recession. By 
definition, these banks are “systemically important” because, due to their size and impact, their 
hypothetical failure would cause a financial “system” collapse. In addition to the FSB, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, and more specifically the Third Basel Accord, requires each 
G-SIB to maintain a certain capital adequacy ratio in an effort to prevent potential bankruptcy in 
period of financial downturn. 
The Financial Stability Board classifies the following five bank holding companies as G-
SIBs: Bank of America Corporation, JPMorgan Chase, The Goldman Sachs Group, Citigroup, 
and Wells Fargo & Company. These five financial institutions also fall under “Peer group 1” in 
the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council classification. Peer group 1 describes 
financial institutions that possess consolidated assets with value greater than or equal to $10 
billion.  
Furthermore, per the National Information Center (NIC), the aforementioned bank 
holding companies together possess over half of the total assets of all bank holding companies 
exceeding $10 billion in assets – the five largest banks hold 50.36% of the total assets in this 
category. The other 49.64% of assets belong to the remaining 110 bank holding companies in the 
list. This piece of information is critical in the sample selection; the asset allocation of the top five 
bank holding companies portrays an incredibly skewed data set. In other words, through their 
relatively massive asset bases, the top five banks have the power to drive the industry and shape 
financial markets. As previously stated, most of the systemic risk in the United States today 
emanates from these five bank holding companies. Therefore, examined in aggregate, I use the 
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following banks to represent the United States financial system. Table 1 depicts the top five bank 
holding companies by asset size (assets shown in 000’s). 
 
Bank Holding Company Headquarter Location Total Assets (As of 12/31/2016) 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. New York, NY $2,490,972,000 
Bank of America Corporation Charlotte, NC $2,189,266,000 
Wells Fargo & Company San Francisco, CA $1,930,115,000 
Citigroup Inc. New York, NY $1,792,077,000 
The Goldman Sachs Group New York, NY $860,185,000 
 
 
I restrict my observations to the following range: 2013 Q1 – 2016 Q4. Due to availability 
of data from the Federal Reserve, the fourth quarter of 2016 is the most recent financial 
performance report accessible for observation at the time of this research study. Beginning the 
analysis in the first quarter of 2013 allows for sufficient data observation before the 
announcement of the Volcker Rule and before the full compliance deadline. The selected time 
range provides six quarters of financial data to trace after full implementation. Hypothetically, 
this is an adequate amount of time to track the financial effect of the Volcker Rule. Through the 
defined time range, I capture financial metrics of the bank holding companies before, during, and 
after full implementation of the Volcker Rule. This ensures proper analysis of financial trends 
pre-Volcker and post-Volcker in the American financial system. Within those trends lies what I 
seek to answer with this research study: the impact on profitability of the Volcker Rule on the 
five bank holding companies in the sample section. 
 
Research Design 
I designed my research as a continuous time series between two points in time – the 
starting point being the first quarter of 2013, and the ending point being the fourth quarter of 
2016. The SEC required full implementation of the Volcker Rule by the applicable FDIC-insured 
Table 1 
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financial institutions on July 21, 2015. Thus, the selected period allows for enough time before 
and after this specific date to measure significant changes in bank profitability: ten quarters 
before the deadline and six quarters following full required enactment. Examining the time series, 
I observe the selected defining measures of the consolidated financial statements and follow their 
trends over time. (More information on defining measures is provided in the Metrics section.) 
From this analysis of the time series, I investigate the central question of the research study: I 
posit whether the Volcker Rule has caused a substantial decrease in bank profitability within the 
selected financial institutions. I draw conclusions from the data by firstly analyzing how the 
banking industry reacted to the Volcker Rule, followed by how each specific bank holding 
company was impacted by the regulation. As a secondary analysis, I describe how this financial 
impact varies across each systemically important bank. 
Through the secondary analysis of the data, I examine a differential effect of the Volcker 
Rule implementation on the bank holding companies chosen. To measure how the Volcker Rule 
impacts the banks to varying degrees, I compare the results of the two banks that have the greatest 
variety in their bank strategies: Wells Fargo and Goldman Sachs. Theoretically, considering that 
the Volcker Rule targets certain types of trading, investment banks should experience a greater 
reduction in profitability than commercially-focused banks. Wells Fargo is the most retail-
focused bank holding company in the dataset. The firm focuses on commercial banking, 
exemplified by extending residential loans, issuing checking and savings accounts, and providing 
mortgages. Wells Fargo’s investment banking arm is young and underdeveloped relative to its 
peers in this study’s sample section.  
On the other hand, Goldman Sachs represents the traditional investment bank in this 
analysis. Goldman Sachs does not conduct operations in retail banking and is the only bank 
holding company in the sample section without a commercial banking arm. As Morgan Stanley 
analyst Betsy Graseck noted, the Volcker Rule could translate into a bigger reduction in trading 
revenue, and consequently, profitability for Goldman Sachs due to its reliance on trading (Patel 
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2013). That is, due to the diversified focus of Bank of America, JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs, 
Wells Fargo, and Citigroup, respectively, on a variety of banking activities, a restriction focused 
on trading should affect differently the firms. I note any divergent effects of the Volcker 
regulation in every metric listed and describe the reasons for these trends. Through use of Wells 
Fargo and Goldman Sachs as the divergent financial institutions in this study, the differential 
impact of the Volcker Rule can be examined. The differential impact evaluation follows through 
the research study. 
 
Gathering Data 
 To properly analyze the profitability of the top five bank-holding companies, I perused 
their consolidated financial statements – balance sheets and income statements – in the form of 
Bank Holding Company Performance Reports and Federal Reserve (FR) Y-9C reports. The 
Federal Reserve requires quarterly reporting on financial data by regulated banks. Bank Holding 
Company Performance Reports (BHCPR) are produced and published by the Federal Reserve and 
serve as a supervisory tool, aiding with on-site examination and inspections, as well as off-site 
surveillance and monitoring (FRB 2014). The reports list consolidated information from financial 
statements, competitive ratios, and peer percentiles. Given that BHCPRs provide an overview of a 
bank’s financial condition, I examined these reports firstly to determine which measures would be 
most applicable to my research. Subsequently, I employed Y-9C reports to delve into more 
comprehensive data, which I used to construct a model to analyze. In essence, the Bank Holding 
Company Performance Reports summarize the Y-9C reports. 
The Federal Reserve issues FR Y-9C reports on a quarterly basis. The Y-9C report forms 
detail the consolidated financial statements at the bank holding company level, in the form of a 
balance sheet, an income statement, and detailed supporting schedules. The purpose of the Y-9C 
is to monitor the financial health of a holding company and its subsidiaries. The form serves as a 
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primary analytical tool for regulators and analysts as it contains more schedules than any FR Y-9, 
making it the most widely requested and reviewed report at the holding company level (FRB). 
 I downloaded the Y-9C reports in bulk .TXT files from the Chicago Federal Reserve 
website for the 16 quarters observed in my study: Q1 2013 – Q4 2016. I imported the raw data 
into Excel to distribute into columns and manipulate the figures. I consequently filtered for the 
top five bank holding companies I examined in my research. Each financial institution, at the 
bank holding company level, is required to report over 2000 metrics painting a picture of the 
company’s financial standing at the time of reporting. The metrics are coded with mnemonics that 
correlate to specific line items on the firms’ balance sheets and income statements. The 
mnemonic codes aid in consolidation and distribution of the reports. I decoded the mnemonics to 
translate the codes into the corresponding line item title, making the data easier to interpret. These 
2000 metrics were surveyed and narrowed down to the most appropriate and applicable measures 
that illustrate the financial impact of the Volcker Rule. From these specific line items, I was able 
to analyze any potential change in profitability for each of the bank holding companies as a result 
of the Volcker Rule implementation. (The metrics and their mnemonic codes are listed in detail in 
Appendix A.) 
The ‘BHCK’ prefix to the mnemonic codes denotes that the reporting numbers are at the 
bank holding company level. The FR Y-9C is filed by bank holding companies with consolidated 
assets of over $500 billion (FRB). For this reason, I only assess metrics with the mnemonics 
beginning with BHCK. In this manner, I examine the financial institutions in totality, 
standardizing for the varying organizational structures across my sample section. 
 
Metrics 
I selected return on assets, trading revenue, trading assets, and the value of specific 
derivative contracts as the defining measures in my study. Examined in conjunction, these metrics 
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provide information about the financial impact of the Volcker Rule on trading activity within 
banks, and more importantly, the regulation’s impact on bank holding company profitability.  
First, I looked to the balance sheet portion of each bank holding company to find the total 
assets figure. Total assets provide information about how the balance sheet has changed over the 
observable period. The total assets figure also serves as a scaling basis for several measures 
selected in this study. Dividing by total assets aids in standardizing the varying reported figures 
for each bank. Scaling each bank holding company’s reported figures to the respective bank’s 
total assets is critical in comparing data across the various financial institutions observed, as the 
revenue and net income that banks report need to be measured against the assets that helped 
generate the revenue and net income. I measured total assets on a notional basis: 
 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
 
To begin the income statement analysis, I examined bank profitability, turning to the net 
income line item on the financial statements. I examined bank holding company profitability 
through Return on Assets, the most common measure of profitability used by financial analysts. 
Using this ratio as opposed to net income on a nominal basis is critical to analysis because it 
scales the net income generated by each bank holding company to its underlying assets. The Bank 
Holding Company Performance Reports lists the values in percentage form. Both the net income 
and the total assets value in the metric are reported on a quarterly basis by the Federal Reserve, 
and the return on assets (ROA) ratio is computed by the following formula:   
 𝑁𝑒𝑡	𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
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Consequently, I focused on the trading habits of each bank, as this is the target of the 
Volcker Rule. To analyze trends in trading activity on an all-encompassing level, I examined the 
level of trading assets of the financial institutions over the selected time range. Examining trading 
on an all-encompassing level includes collecting data from all trading desks – not just those who 
focused on proprietary trading – and the trading assets the desks hold for bank. The trading assets 
line item on the Y-9C form reports the value of all assets held in trading accounts (FRB). I 
examined the trading assets figure on a nominal value basis: 
 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
 
Additionally, I measured how the trading activity of a bank changed in proportion to all 
activities. I wanted to discover how much emphasis each financial institution placed on trading 
activity as a source of revenue over the time-range. To see how the trading assets portion of the 
balance sheet changed – either shrank or expanded – I examined trading assets as a percentage of 
total bank holding company assets over the 16–quarter period. This information suggests whether 
or not banks rearranged their balance sheets, and if they were doing so to move away from 
trading or to concentrate more assets in their trading activity. I used the following formula to 
measure the change in emphasis on trading assets over the time series: 
 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  
 
Measuring how trading impacts one factor of profitability is critical in my analysis and 
conclusion. Revenue is the first figure that flows into the profitability line item of a bank holding 
company. All costs, interest expense, and taxes are subtracted from revenue to arrive at the net 
income value each year, which is used to compute the return on assets ratio used for analysis and 
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peer comparison. (The Federal Reserve Board also requires banks to report quarterly year-to-date 
net income on their Y-9C reports.) To measure how the trends in trading activity impact 
profitability from this perspective, I examined trading revenue and its trend over the observable 
period.  
Trading revenue is an applicable measure because the Volcker Rule’s restrictions on 
proprietary trading should impact it specifically. Many investment banks dedicated entire trading 
desks to proprietary trading because of its lucrative nature. The restriction of certain types of 
trades resulted in spin-offs of the respective desks – some banks closed down their desks 
completely, while others restructured and shifted the proprietary trading activities to other parts of 
the business to comply with the Volcker regulation. The prohibition of proprietary trading should 
yield a decrease in trading revenue.  
To measure the trend of trading revenue over time, I scaled it by dividing by the trading 
assets that generated the trading revenue. This scaling allowed me to partially control for external 
market conditions that may have affected trading revenue, as well as the varying nominal value of 
each bank’s trading assets, which shows the differential emphasis on trading. Further, considering 
that the Federal Reserve reports trading revenue as an annual, cumulative measure, I converted 
the reported values to quarterly values in my data analysis to match the quarterly volumes of 
trading assets. For each quarter listed, I subtracted the sum of the trading revenue for all 
preceding quarters in the respective year of data. For example, to report the 2015 Q4 measure, I 
subtracted the sum of Q1—Q3 of 2015 to arrive at the appropriate number. Consequently, I used 
the following formula to examine trading revenue in proportion to trading assets over the period: 
 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  
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In addition to observing how trading revenue was affected as a result of the Volcker Rule 
implementation, I looked into how trading revenue flowed down the income statement into the 
operating income of a bank holding company’s financials. I examined this specific dataset 
through a value collected from the BHCPR, where it is reported as a percentage of the adjusted 
operating income on a tax equivalent basis. Operating income, as reported by the Federal 
Reserve, resembles a company’s income after deducting operating expenses from total revenue. 
This ratio displays how critical the value of trading revenue is to each respective bank’s activity 
and profitability. The below ratio depicts the “net gain or loss recognized from trading cash 
instruments and derivative contracts (including commodity contracts) divided by adjusted 
operating income on a taxable equivalent basis” (FRB). I used the following formula: 
 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑	𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 
 
Finally, I examined the effect of the proprietary trading restriction on more specific 
trading habits of the bank. I wanted to see how much the Volcker Rule has reduced the nominal 
value of certain trades. Interest rates desks assumed the bulk of the proprietary trading before the 
Volcker Rule was instituted. Therefore, I selected the following specific derivative instruments as 
measures of rates trading: interest rate derivative contracts and foreign exchange (FX) derivative 
contracts. I expected this data to depict how much proprietary trading existed within these 
specific trading desks, and how the Volcker Rule impacted the notional value of the trading 
contracts. Thus, these measures should reflect a direct impact of the regulation.  
Further, a change in the levels of these specific derivatives contracts could be the reason 
for the change in the value of trading assets. Such a trend would display how the trading activity 
is contingent on rates trading assets, and consequently, how trading assets are impacted by the 
Volcker Rule. The Y-9C reports divide both the interest rate contracts and FX contracts two 
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categories: contracts held for trading and contracts held for purposes other than trading. However, 
I examined only the contracts that are held for trading on a notional basis for the purposes of 
analysis. Additionally, I used the value of the derivative contracts used for purposes other than 
trading to compare the values of the two distinctions of contracts in my analysis. I measured the 
values on a notional basis: 
 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡	𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒	𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠	𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑑	𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡	𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒	𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠	𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑑	𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑠	𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟	𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛	𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑛	𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒	𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠	𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑑	𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛	𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒	𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠	𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑑	𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑠	𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟	𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛	𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 
 
Derivative contracts are instruments used to hedge (which protects investor’s from a 
security’s risk) and bet against the price movement of the underlying asset. The trader who takes 
on these futures and forward contracts does not own the stock, but rather takes a risk on how it 
will perform. For example, if a trader thinks that a certain stock will depreciate in value in two 
weeks – the trader would buy a “put” option that allows the trader to sell the stock at today’s 
price, in the future, giving the trader an advantage of the price difference between the two points 
in time. These specific measures depict how the top five bank holding companies have contained 
their risk-taking post-Volcker Rule implementation, as well as, how the regulation specifically 
impacted the trading activity in these markets. 
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RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
 Throughout this section, my analyses focus on the marketplace implications of 
diminished profitability across United States banks. Through the data collected and my analyses, 
I conclude that the Volcker Rule implementation did not cause a substantial decrease in bank 
profitability between its full enactment and the end of the fourth quarter of 2016. Firstly, my data 
reports on the key profitability measures of the bank holding companies. Subsequent to these 
analyses, my argument focuses the scope of the analysis to trading activity at the bank-level, 
delving deeper into the target of the Volcker Rule to depict how it might have impacted trading. 
From trading figures on an all-encompassing level, I go into further detail and describe the trends 
in trading activity of the selected specific trading desks – interest rate and foreign exchange 
derivatives – where most of the proprietary trading occurred. 
 
Return on Assets  
This research study sought to answer whether the Volcker Rule had a negative impact on 
the profitability of the top five bank holding companies. Through data charting, I examine the 
effect of the Volcker Rule implementation on the total return on assets of the sample section on 
an individual basis over the observable period. Figure 1 shows the average return on assets of the 
banking industry, defined by the five bank holding companies, from 2013 Q4 to 2016 Q4. (Due to 
availability of data from the NIC, return on assets will be examined over this period.) The net 
income value reported by the Federal Reserve is scaled to the average assets of the firm, as seen 
in the Bank Holding Company Performance Reports. Therefore, net income in this analysis is 
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examined as a percentage of average assets. The average assets figure used denotes the “year-to-
date cumulative sum of the quarterly average consolidated assets divided by the number of 
calendar quarters to date (four-point average)” (FRB). Both the values that construct the return on 
assets ratio – net income and average assets – are reported in quarterly values.  
 
 
 
From Figure 1, it is evident that the average profitability of the banking industry did not 
decrease over the period examined. Although the trend line decreases immediately after the 
Volcker Rule implementation deadline, marked by the vertical red line, the average industry ROA 
recovers and begins growing in the first quarter of 2016. Thus, the combined return on asset 
figures for all five banks result in an increase over the whole period examined, marked by the 
statistical trend line. This trend suggests that the Volcker Rule prohibition of proprietary trading 
did not have an adverse impact on banking industry profitability as predicted by critics of the 
rule. However, not every bank holding company experienced growth in profitability over the 
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period to construct the increasing industry average. Figure 2 depicts each bank’s return on assets 
and their statistical trends over the studied period.  
 
 
 
Through the lens of Volcker Rule critics, the rule’s restriction on proprietary trading 
should hypothetically have a negative impact on the profitability of the banks, reducing net 
income, and in turn reducing return on assets. However, as seen in Figure 2, no banks saw more 
than an 11% decrease in ROA from Q3 to Q4 of 2015 as a result of the Volcker Rule, which was 
implemented in the Q3 of 2015. Additionally, the return on asset ratios reported are not the lowest 
recorded values in the period observed. The chart suggests that 2014 was the toughest year for 
financial institutions, as all banks except Wells Fargo reported lower levels of profitability 
relative to the other years in the period. This implies that the Volcker Rule did not cause a drastic 
negative impact on profitability of the financial institutions in the period studied. 
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The most substantial decrease from the third to the fourth quarter of 2015 in this metric – 
11% – is attributed to Goldman Sachs. Conversely, Wells Fargo boasted the lowest decrease in 
ROA quarter-over-quarter, reporting a 2% decline. This disparity provides evidence to support 
the argument that the Volcker Rule caused a differential impact on bank holding companies with 
different business focuses. Goldman Sachs, being the typical investment bank in the sample, 
suffered more than Wells Fargo, which focuses in the retail banking sector. 
Another interesting pattern to note in these trends is the convergence of all five bank 
holding companies’ return on assets ratios over the period. Leading up to and initially following 
the full implementation of the Volcker Rule on July 21, 2015, the ROA of the banks trend toward 
a ratio of 0.9. That is, over the period examined, the difference between the most and least 
profitable banks is reduced. This suggests that the Volcker Rule, through its restriction on a 
lucrative type of trading, helped stabilize profitability among the five largest banks.  
Figure 2 also includes statistical trend lines that accompany the return on asset figures. A 
variety of external factors affect return on assets. Immediately after the full implementation of the 
Volcker Rule, all banks’ ROA slightly decreased. However, financial institutions recovered and 
posted increases in return on assets in the first quarter of 2016, only three quarters after the 
Volcker Rule implementation deadline. Through statistical analysis, I examine the trend lines of 
each bank over the selected period. (Statistical model shown in Appendix B.) With statistical 
significance, Bank of America and JP Morgan actually experienced an increase in their return on 
assets over the period studied. This suggests that the Volcker Rule did not have as substantial an 
effect as predicted by those opposing the regulation (when measured in a 16-quarter period.) It is 
possible that external market an economic factors had an overpowering impact of the profitability 
of the five banks. Further, whatever negative impact the Volcker Rule did cause on banks’ return 
on assets ratios, the financial institutions were able to recover and return to previous, if not 
higher, levels of profitability. 
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Trading Activities 
From examining profitability measures on a firm-wide basis, I turn to trading activity, 
which the Volcker Rule targeted specifically. The trading assets of a bank holding company 
depict the value of assets held in trading accounts, which are traders utilize to generate trading 
revenue. The change in trading assets over the period shows how the banks reallocated their 
assets, theoretically to optimize revenue and profitability. To see how the banking industry 
employed asset reallocation to comply with the Volcker Rule, I examine the nominal value of 
trading assets of all five banks and their trends over time. Figure 3 illustrates these values.  
 
 
 
Figure 3 suggests that the industry, defined by the five banks in this sample, is all 
together reducing the amount of trading assets they hold on their balance sheets. With statistical 
significance, the value of trading assets decreased 18.85% over the 16-quarter period. It is 
important to note that banks began reducing their trading assets at the onset of the studied period. 
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A possibility exists that this trend occurred before the examined period. This implies that, upon 
the Volcker Rule’s announcement, bank holding companies initiated their internal compliance 
programs to roll off the newly restricted proprietary trading. Nonetheless, not all banks reacted in 
a similar manner to the Volcker Rule. While the banking industry reduced their trading assets 
over time, some of the financial institutions had a greater impact on this industry total. Figure 4 
depicts the trading assets of each bank holding company examined. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 depicts how each bank has consistently decreased or increased their trading 
assets over the observable period. With statistical significance at a value of .05, Bank of America, 
JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs, and Citigroup all experienced a reduction in trading assets. 
(Statistical model show in Appendix C.) The only outlier in this metric is Wells Fargo, as its 
trading assets increased over the 16-quarter period, also with statistical significance. As 
mentioned earlier, Wells Fargo focuses in retail and commercial banking as opposed to Goldman 
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Sachs’s investment banking focus. Thus, Wells Fargo’s diverging data trend can be attributed to 
the bank’s young investment banking arm – Wells Fargo Securities. Wells Fargo Securities was 
founded as a result of the 2009 merger with Wachovia Securities. Wells Fargo’s increase in 
trading assets, which opposes the typical trend of the remaining financial institutions analyzed, 
suggests that it was not as affected by the Volcker Rule as the investment banking-focused firms 
in the sample. This, coupled with its significantly smaller value of trading assets, portrays the 
differential impact of the Volcker Rule on the top five bank holding companies through a trading 
activity perspective.  
Through proprietary trading’s prominence in investment banks rather than commercial 
banks, the Volcker Rule is successfully targeted at the investment banks which participated in 
proprietary trading. The differential impact of the Volcker Rule on the bank holding companies in 
the sample can be seen through each bank’s specific reliance on trading activities. A reliance on 
trading can be examined by calculating how much of their balance sheet is devoted to trading 
assets. Under the assumption that assets help generate revenue, a higher proportion of trading 
assets implies greater reliance on trading as a source of revenue. In theory, the greater 
dependence a bank places on trading as a source of revenue, the more heavily a prohibition on a 
certain type of trading should impact it financially. Figure 5 shows the trading assets proportion 
of each bank’s total assets, accompanied the industry average. 
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According to Figure 5, it is evident that the industry average is decreasing over the period 
examined, which suggests that all bank holding companies are reallocating their assets to move 
away from trading. It is also clear from Figure 5 that each bank reduced their trading assets at 
different rates. Goldman Sachs, through its reported trading assets percentage, relies more heavily 
on trading activity as a source of revenue and income. Goldman’s average proportion of trading 
to total assets over the 16-quarter period was 35.88%. On the other end of the spectrum, Wells 
Fargo clearly focuses its core activity outside of trading, evidenced by its proportion of assets 
held in trading accounts – the average percent of total assets the company allocated to trading 
accounts was 4.3%. From this analysis, it is reasonable to presume that the prohibition of 
proprietary trading had a more considerable impact on Goldman Sachs than Wells Fargo, as 
Goldman Sachs showed a greater reduction in trading assets. To quantify this, I take the average 
of the trading asset proportion before and after full implementation of the Volcker Rule: Goldman 
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Sachs’s average ratio dropped from 37.87% to 32.56% – a decrease of 5.31%, or 14% of the 
original average. When calculated for Wells Fargo, the average proportion of trading assets 
changed from 4.31% to 4.27%, a reduction of 0.04%, or .99% of the original value. (Percent 
change charts are presented in detail in Appendix D.) The figure illustrates this through a steeper 
declining trend for Goldman Sachs. Although Wells Fargo increased its nominal value of trading 
assets according to Figure 4, the relatively static ratio of trading to total assets implies that Wells 
Fargo is increasing its total asset base over the period as well. When scaled in this way, it is 
evident that the Volcker Rule impacted the trading assets of each bank differently. This 
discrepancy in focus on trading activity as a core banking operations allows for this differential 
impact of the regulation. 
To analyze the impact of the Volcker Rule on the division of banking it targets, I 
examined the bank holding companies’ income statements. I narrowed the scope to the trading 
revenue portion of the banks’ income statements. Trading revenue flows into the total revenue of 
each financial institution, and all expenses are deducted from banks’ total revenue to arrive at 
their measures of profitability. Therefore, examining changes in trading revenue is critical to 
examining the financial impact of the Volcker Rule. On an aggregate level, this shows how the 
industry’s trading revenue is changing over the period. Figure 6 illustrates trading revenue on an 
industry level over the 16-quarter period. Given that the Y-9C data reports trading revenue as a 
year-to-date figure, it has been converted to quarterly values in this research study for the purpose 
of analysis. 
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Figure 6 shows the industry trading revenue on a quarterly basis over the 16-quarter 
period. The year-over-year volatility of the line charts implies that many other external factors, 
such as market conditions, concurrent regulations, and America’s economic state, are in play. 
This routine volatility affected trading revenue on an industry-wide level Further, a significant 
negative impact of the full Volcker Rule implementation does not exist as expected: the p-value 
of the downward regression line is .43. This suggests that the external factors in this scenario 
could have exerted an overpowering effect on bank trading revenue over the studied period. To 
examine how the Volcker Rule impacts each bank’s trading revenue specifically, Figure 7 
illustrates the bank holding companies’ trading revenue over the period. 
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 Again, a differential impact of the regulation is evident in the data presented. Goldman 
Sachs, the best representation of a typical investment bank, reports the highest trading revenue in 
nine of the 16 quarters observed. Conversely, Wells Fargo records the lowest value among all 
five bank holding companies in every quarter in the period except for Q4 of 2013. After the 
implementation of the Volcker Rule, Goldman Sachs’s trading revenue continues to maintain 
high volatility. This is also seen in Bank of America, JP Morgan, and Citigroup, banks which also 
focus in investment banking more heavily than Wells Fargo. As mentioned earlier, the external 
factors in this specific metric may overpower the financial impact of Volcker. However, the 
relatively low volatility of Wells Fargo’s trend in trading revenue shows a differential impact on 
banks with diversified activity focuses. 
The trend in trading revenue over the period, when measured as a proportion of operating 
income, portrays how trading has fluctuated as it relates to the profitability of a bank. This value 
shows how trading revenue flows down the income statement into the profitability of a financial 
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institution, namely depicting how vital trading revenue is to the operating income of that firm. 
The operating income line item on a company’s financial statement shows the income before 
deducting taxes and interest expense. Figure 8 shows the trading revenue as a percentage of 
adjusted operating income of each of the five bank holding companies, including the industry 
average. (The first three quarters of the overarching time series are omitted due to availability of 
data from the Federal Reserve.)  
 
 
 
From Figure 8, several trends can be extracted. Immediately following the full 
compliance deadline of the Volcker Rule, four of the five observed banks did not report an 
unprecedented drop in trading revenue as a percentage of operating income – decreases in trading 
revenue just as sizeable had occurred in previous quarters during the observable period. Goldman 
Sachs proved to be the only exception to this trend. With the exception of Goldman Sachs, the 
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other banks maintained a relatively steady percentage trading revenue of operating income. On 
one hand, this could imply that both trading revenue and operating income are decreasing as a 
result of the Volcker Rule, essentially diminishing profitability. Under this assumption, trading 
revenue would remain as important to the operating income, and consequently, the return on 
assets of a company. However, on the other hand, it is possible that the Volcker Rule did not 
impact substantially either trading revenue or bank holding company operating income. This is 
consistent with the preceding trading revenue analysis, which suggested that outlying factors 
could have overpowered the perceived diminishing impact of the Volcker Rule on trading 
revenue. 
Secondly, from Figure 8, it is clear that Goldman Sachs relies heavily on trading relative 
to its peers, as also noted in the trading assets analysis. Their average trading revenue of adjusted 
operating income proportion over the period exceeds consistently that of Wells Fargo by a 
multiple greater than four. This suggests that Goldman Sachs has the most company-level 
revenue at stake with the implementation of the Volcker Rule, which confirms Betsy Graseck’s 
prediction that Goldman Sachs would be “most affected by the new rules” (Patel 2013). 
Furthermore, Goldman Sachs is the only bank holding company that saw their trading revenue as 
a percentage of total operating income drop below any level recorded in the 13-quarter period 
studied. This implies that, since the Volcker Rule impacted Goldman Sachs’s core banking 
activity more heavily than any other bank observed, the firm was tasked with the most 
reallocation of business activities of its peers to preserve its traditional levels of operating 
income.  
 The Volcker Rule’s differential impact emerges in this financial metric. Wells Fargo, the 
most commercially-focused bank of the sample, maintained trading revenue between 0% and 2% 
of total operating income. Wells Fargo’s low levels of this percentage warrants the ratio’s small 
fluctuation over the period. Wells Fargo saw small changes in this metric, while Goldman Sachs 
experienced more volatility. Thus, the divergent effects of the Volcker Rule regulation on bank 
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holding companies can be observed in two ways in this specific financial measure: the decrease in 
the percentage of trading revenue as it related to operating income and the fluctuation of trading 
revenue percentage within each bank. 
 However, regression analysis states that the overall decreasing trend in trading revenue as 
a percentage of adjusted operating income was not statistically significant. This is true for all five 
banks in the sample section. This trend could be offset by the notable spike in trading revenue in 
Q1 of 2015. While the first quarter of the year is typically the strongest in terms of trading 
revenue, 2015 was different. In this specific quarter, equities trading skyrocketed within each 
bank, increasing their trading revenue dramatically. This stemmed from an unexpected move on 
part of the Swiss Central Bank: the SCB removed the cap on the Swiss franc (Trefis 2015). 
Combined with other market factors, the SCB’s decision acted as a catalyst to equities trading 
within banks, making the first quarter of 2015 one of the most profitable in terms on trading 
revenue. Considering this is an isolated market event that impacted trading within large bank 
holding companies and affected the trend in my analysis, many other factors play together to 
influence trading revenue as a proportion of adjusted operating income. Therefore, through the 
lens of trading revenue as a percentage of operating income, the Volcker Rule does not impact 
substantially bank profitability in a way from which the bank holding companies cannot recover. 
 
Specific Trading Desk Activities 
 Most of the proprietary trading concentrated in the rates desks of big banks, namely 
interest rate derivative contracts and foreign exchange derivative contracts. These securities help 
generate the trading revenue the banks report. Considering they are directly affected by the 
Volcker Rule, I examined how the regulation has impacted the value of the contracts. At a more 
granular level, I observed the trend of these specific contracts before, during, and after the 
implementation of the Volcker Rule. The Federal Reserve Y-9C forms distinguish the notional 
value of derivative contracts into “held for trading” and “held for purposes other than trading” for 
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reporting purposes (FRB). Since the Volcker Rule targets a certain type of trading, I only 
examined the value of the contracts “held for trading.” Figure 9 depicts the trend in the notional 
value of interest rate derivative contracts held for trading for the five banks in the sample section. 
 
 
 
According to Figure 9, the notional value of interest rate derivative contracts held for 
trading decreased 30.21% over the period. Through regression analysis, the value reduction 
proves to be statistically significant. This drop in value of interest rate derivative contracts 
typifies the Volcker Rule’s restriction on proprietary trading. This also suggests how greatly these 
specific securities, and the financial markets in which they traded, relied on proprietary trading. 
Considering that the five sample bank holding companies comprise the industry total for this 
metric, each firm’s reported figures impact the direction of the industry totals. However, not all 
banks’ interest rates trading desks reacted in similar ways to the implementation of the Volcker 
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regulation. Figure 10 illustrates the banks’ individual reported notional values of interest rate 
derivative contracts over the period. 
 
 
 
As seen in Figure 10, interest rate derivative contracts held for trading decreased 
significantly over the period for all bank holding companies, with the exception of Wells Fargo. 
Interestingly, Goldman Sachs experiences a decrease in the notional value of interest rate 
contracts held for trading, but not with statistical significance. This counters previous analysis 
that the Volcker Rule had a greater impact on typical investment banking-focused financial 
institutions. This statistical trend could show that Goldman Sachs implemented a smoother 
transition into the Volcker Rule than its peers, considering the bank had the most potential 
revenue at stake. However, the trend line also suggests that, due to Goldman Sachs’s heavy 
reliance on trading as a source of revenue, the firm experienced more volatility in exiting the 
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newly restricted interest rate positions. Trading volatility could be a reason for the lack of 
statistical significance. 
Further, Figure 10 represents that JP Morgan, Bank of America, and Citigroup 
experienced the greatest percentage decline in the notional value of interest rate derivative 
contracts. The value reduction in derivative contracts was significant for all three banks. This 
could be due to the fact that the three firms held greater amounts of interest rate derivative 
contracts in the first quarter of 2013. Conversely, Wells Fargo’s growth in interest rate derivative 
contracts opposes the general trend in this metric. Wells Fargo’s increasing trend suggests that the 
Volcker Rule was not as impactful on banks that focus in commercial banking, or that Wells 
Fargo did not participate in proprietary trading with this specific financial instrument. 
Moreover, for purpose of comparison, Figure 11 shows the value of the interest rate 
derivatives held for trading and the interest rate derivative contracts held for purposes other than 
trading. Contracts held for purposes other than trading are used for hedging debt and equity 
securities or other assets or liabilities not held for trading. These contracts are reported at a value 
that is “marked to market,” meaning they are reported at their fair market value.  
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According to Figure 11, the notional value of interest rate derivative contracts held for 
trading greatly exceed the notional value of those contracts held for purposes other than trading. It 
is important to note that this difference ranges from multiples of seven to 1200. This shows how 
much more heavily banks relied on the actual trading of interest rates as opposed to hedging 
against those trades and protecting the firm in the case of financial loss. Wells Fargo’s ratios of 
contracts held for trading to contracts held for purposes other than trading ranged from 6.80 to 
12.67 over the period, while Citigroup boasted the highest range of ratios in the sample of banks: 
581.05 to 1252.77.  (A table showing the ratio of trading derivatives to those held for purposes 
other than trading, segmented by bank holding company, is provided in Appendix E.) 
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Consistent with previous analysis, Wells Fargo reported the lowest ratio of trading to 
non-traded rates derivatives contracts. The financial institution second to Wells Fargo in this 
regard is Bank of America, who also boasts a strong retail branch and commercial banking 
activity. The primarily investment banking-focused financial institutions, Goldman Sachs, JP 
Morgan, and Citigroup, evidently placed a greater emphasis on using derivative contracts for 
trading rather than hedging purposes. The discrepancy between these two groups of banks further 
exemplifies the varying levels of impact the Volcker Rule exerted on the relevant bank holding 
companies. In addition to interest rate derivative contracts, foreign exchange (FX) derivative 
desks also assumed considerable proprietary trading before the Volcker Rule implementation. 
Figure 12 illustrates the value of FX derivatives contracts on an industry-wide basis. 
 
 
 
An interesting and contradictory trend emerges from the FX values reported in Figure 12. 
Considering that proprietary trading was a large part of the foreign exchange market, the Volcker 
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Rule should hypothetically have caused a substantial decrease in the value of these contracts, as it 
caused with the interest rate derivative contracts. However, FX derivative contracts held for 
trading increased over the period on an industry-wide basis. All bank holding companies 
experienced individual increased in the notional value of FX derivative contracts held for trading. 
This pattern contradicts the perceived restrictive effect of the Volcker Rule on the derivative 
trading desks and counters the prior trend in the interest rates derivative contracts. The pattern 
suggests that an external factor impacted the foreign exchange trading desks. The FX derivative 
data for each individual bank holding company are illustrated through Figure 13. 
 
 
 
Several external factors may be at play in the foreign exchange derivatives market which 
caused the unanticipated trend. Firstly, the nature of foreign exchange derivative trading implies 
that its activities are centered on a global arena. Although the Volcker Rule includes the U.S.-
based operations of foreign financial institutions in its proprietary trading restriction, it is 
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plausible that the trading activity increased due to growing global demand. Further, the foreign 
exchange market is a large and growing one (Potter 2015). Derivatives accounted for 60% of the 
total global FX trading turnover in 2013. Derivative instruments “play an important role in 
helping transfer a wide variety of risks from entities that cannot or do not want to bear it” (Potter 
2015). Thus, the foreign exchange market is critical to the global economy and may not be as 
affected by the Volcker Rule than other trading instruments. Under the assumption that each of 
the five bank holding companies observed has a global presence, it is safe to presume that this 
market feature is one reason for the contradictory trend in FX derivative contracts. Once again, an 
evident discrepancy is seen with Wells Fargo – the firm’s derivative contracts held for trading 
increase at a much slower rate than the rest of its competitors in the sample, while also 
maintaining a substantially lower value. This can also be attributed to Wells Fargo’s focus in the 
commercial banking sector, contributing to the Volcker Rule’s weaker impact on its derivative 
contracts. 
 
Conclusion 
Following its initial announcement, the Volcker Rule, through its prohibition on 
proprietary trading, was predicted by critics to have a substantial negative impact on the trading 
capabilities and profitability of large, systemically important financial holding companies. 
Through a profitability lens, my analysis stated that the return on assets of the bank holding 
companies studied did not experience any unrecoverable decrease. That is, while net income as a 
proportion of total assets initially declined following the July 21, 2015 deadline, all banks in the 
sample successfully recovered their previous levels of net income. In some cases, banks exceeded 
them within the specified period of Q1 2013 – Q4 2016, illustrating that the Volcker Rule did not 
drastically impede their ability to produce profits. 
From an overarching perspective, trading revenue figures were too volatile to observe an 
impact caused specifically by the Volcker Rule. The state of the economy over the 16-quarter 
  
 
47 
period, coupled with varying market condition, contributed to this volatility. From the perspective 
of trading revenue, there is no evidence suggesting that Volcker Rule alone caused a decrease in 
bank holding companies’ trading revenue. 
Further, as the data shows, the halt in proprietary trading activity diminished substantially 
the banking industry’s value of interest rate derivatives held for trading, which is a clear indicator 
that most of the activity in this specific market revolved around proprietary trading. However, 
despite proprietary trading also being focused on the foreign exchange derivative market, the 
notional value of FX derivative contracts held for trading increased across all bank holding 
companies. This pattern reflects the growth and global nature of the foreign exchange derivative 
market.  
 An important distinction to note is the differential impact that the Volcker Rule caused. 
In the most extreme divergence, Goldman Sachs and Wells Fargo serve as the benchmark. The 
two financial institutions focus the core of their banking activities on fundamentally different 
areas of financial services: Goldman Sachs is the typical investment bank, while Wells Fargo 
focuses in commercial banking. Through the respective strategic decisions, the banks reacted 
differently to the Volcker Rule. The differences stem from the banks’ varied reliance on trading 
activities as a source of revenue, measured by the proportion of trading assets to total assets. 
Thus, the data suggested an important distinction: the Volcker Rule’s prohibition of proprietary 
trading affected investment banks more substantially than traditional retail banks.  
 
Limitations and Future Research Opportunities 
Certain limitations surrounding the research are important to recognize. Following the 
financial crisis, regulatory agencies enacted a series of reforms to protect the soundness of the 
United States financial system. Thus, the Volcker Rule as a part of the Dodd-Frank Act, was not 
an exclusive regulation at the time of its implementation. Regulators implemented the Volcker 
Rule concurrently with much other legislation. While searching for changes in bank profitability, 
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I controlled for the effects from other regulatory restrictions such as the Third Basel Accord and 
CCAR (Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review). The Third Basel Accord – also known as 
Basel III – places restrictions on the capital ratio that large bank holding companies must keep in 
the event of an economic downturn. The capital ratio, or capital requirement, ensures that a large 
financial institution holds enough high-quality liquid assets (HQLA’s) at any point in time. 
Through strengthening capital requirements and decreasing bank leverage, Basel III protects 
banks and bank holding companies from failing during economic distress. 
On the other hand, the Federal Reserve Board enforces CCAR as an annual test, which 
determines whether financial institutions in the United States keep sufficient capital to sustain 
operations during potential economic downturns. These tests, more commonly referred to as 
“stress tests,” apply to 33 of the largest bank holding companies with operations in the United 
States. Through using hypothetical scenarios, CCAR tests how banks would react to economic 
disasters and determines whether or not each financial institution has a sound and comprehensive 
plan in the event of economic distress. Stress tests conduct both quantitative and qualitative tests 
for the banks and observe the balance sheets of large financial institutions. To best separate and 
control for concurrent regulations, I examined metrics which the Volcker Rule targeted 
specifically, and CCAR and Basel III do not. Nonetheless, it is important to note for the purpose 
of this study that any concurrent regulations could have economic impacts on the financial 
performance of the five bank holding companies that affect the results of this study.  
Additionally, proper examination of the Volcker Rule’s financial impact necessitates time 
restrictions and recognition of the nature of bank compliance. Because exiting the newly 
restricted trading positions could take longer than expected by the regulators, many banks began 
their efforts early to facilitate a longer, smoother transition into the new framework required by 
the legislation (Facini 2016). The regulatory agencies prohibited proprietary trading with the 
announcement of the Volcker Rule in December of 2013, with the initial implementation deadline 
set for April 1, 2014. Therefore, its financial impact on bank holding companies could be seen as 
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early as 2014. However, exiting the newly restricted investments required more time than initially 
expected. The extensive implementation process, coupled with consistent resistance on the part of 
the banks, resulted in multiple deadline extensions to ensure full compliance by all financial 
institutions affected. The regulators complied with requests from the banks and extended the 
deadline multiple times for the Volcker Rule. The final deadline was set for July 21, 2015, 
requiring full implementation and compliance by the applicable financial institutions. Although 
the termination of proprietary trading was a fluid and not sudden process, some proprietary 
trading activity still occurred before the July 21, 2015, compliance deadline. Therefore, 
examining quarters after this date is an accurate representation of the financial state of bank 
holding companies without the existence of any proprietary trading. 
It is important to note that the financial costs of the Volcker Rule are much easier to 
measure than the potential benefits it caused. That is, simulating a financial recession to measure 
how the Volcker Rule could have prevented any financial damage is challenging and nearly 
impossible. Under this assumption, a direct causal relationship between the Volcker Rule and the 
state of the American economy would be difficult to discern. Outlying factors, such as economic 
conditions, unobservable factors could be influencing the financial data used in the research 
study. 
An important limitation of the research study surrounds the economic conditions in the 
United States and market conditions during the observable period. The economy and market 
condition of the American financial system is an integral factor that fundamentally impacts bank 
holding company performance. Performance, in this sense, is defined by profitability. These 
conditions affect the analyzed measures in ways that are impossible and unfeasible to observe or 
control within the scope of my study. For example, the economic state of the United States varies 
over the selected time range in my research. A benchmark does not exist to which I can compare 
each quarter of financial data examined. For this purpose, I would argue that a future study, 
which takes into account the economic state of the United States at each point in the time series, 
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would provide additional insight into the financial impact of the Volcker Rule on the American 
banking industry.  
As previously stated, certain critics of the Volcker Rule cited the essential migration of 
proprietary trading from the regulated banks to the unregulated entities, and not its elimination, as 
a shortcoming of the legislation’s effect. This potential shift is something that the Volcker Rule 
failed to foresee and capture in its regulation of proprietary trading. Some would argue that the 
Volcker Rule actually caused this shift in proprietary trading out of the regulated financial 
markets and into the less-regulated financial institutions, such as hedge funds and alternative asset 
managers. The migration of proprietary trading to the unregulated shadow banking entities poses 
some concern for regulators and bankers, alike. Large hedge funds would be the market actors to 
undertake this trading activity. The existence of speculative trading in the shadow banking world 
could have even more catastrophic effects – as this industry is not regulated, no restrictions exist 
to limit the amount of risk the financial institutions assume. Such excessive risk in the financial 
markets could once again cause an economic downturn in the United States. The regulatory 
agencies do not have the authority to control these covered funds and the risk they undertake, as 
they are not insured by government funds. Instead, private capital solely finances transactions in 
the shadow banking industry. For example, the FDIC-insured banks have the capacity to insure 
their depositors through the government, and in return, government agencies regulate these banks. 
The absence of this relationship within the shadow banking industry restricts any regulatory 
oversight. 
While the Volcker Rule does include a clause which prohibits big bank relationships with 
and sponsorships of hedge funds, ways to circumvent existing regulation exist, as Paul Volcker 
argued. This begs the question of whether the Volcker Rule actually made financial markets safer 
for tax-payers, or merely transferred the risk to less transparent financial institutions. Through its 
regulation of financial institutions that are insured by the FDIC, the Volcker Rule failed to 
capture the unregulated shadow banking system. Thus, a question remains whether the Volcker 
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Rule achieved its mission in reducing systemic risk within the overall financial system, or merely 
transferred it to covered funds. If the risk was in fact shifted to less regulated finance institutions, 
the systemic risk remains in the system and still poses a threat to financial markets. Because these 
less-regulated financial institutions are still intertwined in the overarching financial system, their 
actions could have a substantial impact on the United States economy. 
Examining the shadow banking system and its focus on proprietary trading, which is 
outside the scope of my study, would be an interesting future research endeavor that should be 
pursued. More specifically, the migration of proprietary trading activity and the inherent systemic 
risk attached to it, could be traced from the FDIC-insured and regulated bank holding companies 
into the unregulated entities. The life of proprietary trading could be followed and compared with 
migration of systemic risk in the financial system, essentially concluding whether the Volcker 
Rule in fact reduced overall systemic risk or guided it to the covered funds.
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FUTURE CHALLENGES TO THE VOLCKER RULE 
 
 Thus far, the Volcker Rule has caused much controversy within the banking industry. 
Traders and large financial institutions have voiced their discontent with the regulation, arguing 
that the stringent restrictions on proprietary trading dry up liquidity in the capital markets, 
effectively depleting investment opportunities on a holistic level and shrinking bank holding 
company profitability. However, this study found that the implementation of the Volcker Rule did 
not reduce the return on assets of the top five bank holding companies to levels that were 
unrecoverable. Nonetheless, with the new presidential administration in office, the Volcker Rule 
– and the Dodd-Frank Consumer and Protection Act in totality – could undergo significant 
changes. This could once again fundamentally impact the United States banking industry and 
shift its competitive position in the global arena. As many critics of the regulation argue, it does 
not reduce risk within financial markets, but merely displaces it to less regulated financial 
institutions (the shadow banking sector,) where most hedge funds operate. In other words, the 
expected costs of the regulation outweigh any potential benefits it would bring to the financial 
system. So, a modification to the Dodd-Frank Act to combat this inefficiency is possible. 
 Many financial analysts and traders presumed that the Trump administration would 
prioritize deregulating the financial industry, in part by stripping back bits and pieces of the 
Dodd-Frank Act. Consequently, the financial markets responded to this popular notion, which 
was pushed as a part of Donald Trump’s platform during his campaign. The U.S. markets 
experienced a period of boom after the results of the election, which continues to climb, with the 
DOW breaking 21,000 on March 1, 2017. However, contrary to popular opinion, the President’s 
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Treasury Secretary, Steve Mnuchin, does not currently have plans to revise the Dodd-Frank Act 
as much as the public believed. In his confirmation hearing with the United States Senate, Steve 
Mnuchin, a former Goldman Sachs trader himself, declared his support for the Volcker Rule 
(Egan 2017). He vowed that he would not seek the complete repeal of the regulation, amid 
building expectations from Wall Street that he would do so. Nonetheless, he did note a recently 
published Federal Reserve paper that showed how the regulation’s lack of functionality has 
caused illiquidity within the markets. the Treasury Secretary aims to examine the inefficiency 
while in office. In other words, Steve Mnuchin plans to “fix, not kill” the Volcker Rule (Egan 
2017). Thus, through a political lens, the core of the Volcker Rule and most of its provisions 
could be considered safe for this presidential administration. However, it is possible that potential 
minor technical changes to the legislation and financial regulation could have further measurable 
effects on the revenues and profitability of the top five bank holding companies. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix A 
Mnemonic and Line Item Definitions 
 
Mnemonic Line Item 
BHCK2170 TOTAL ASSETS 
BHCK3545 TRADING ASSETS, TOTAL 
BHCK4340 NET INCOME (LOSS) 
BHCK8725 
TOTAL GROSS NOTIONAL AMOUNT OF INTEREST RATE DERIVATIVE CONTRACTS HELD FOR 
PURPOSES OTHER THAN TRADING: CONTRACTS MARKED TO MARKET 
BHCK8726 
TOTAL GROSS NOTIONAL AMOUNT OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE DERIVATIVE CONTRACTS HELD 
FOR PURPOSES OTHER THAN TRADING: CONTRACTS MARKED TO MARKET 
BHCKA126 
TOTAL GROSS NOTIONAL AMOUNT OF INTEREST RATE DERIVATIVE CONTRACTS HELD FOR 
TRADING 
BHCKA127 
TOTAL GROSS NOTIONAL AMOUNT OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE DERIVATIVE CONTRACTS HELD 
FOR TRADING 
BHCKA220 TRADING REVENUE 
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Appendix B 
Return on Assets Statistical Regression Model 
 
 
Trend Lines Model 
A linear trend model is 
computed for Measure 
Values given Quarter. The 
model may be significant at p 
<= 0.05. The factor Measure 
Names may be significant at 
p <= 0.05. 
	
 
Analysis of Variance: 
	
Field DF SSE MSE F p-value 
Measure Names 8 5.7787654 0.722346 28.742 < 0.0001 
	
Individual Trend Lines: 
	
Panes Color Line Coefficients 
Row Column 
Measure 
Names 
p-value DF Term Value StdErr t-value p-value 
Measure 
Values 
Quarter 
Goldman 
Sachs 
0.12748
4 
11 Quarter -0.0002292 
0.0001
39 
-1.64852 0.127484 
 Intercept 10.4905 
5.8523
6 
1.79252 0.100562 
Measure 
Values 
Quarter Citigroup 
0.16491
1 
11 Quarter 0.0002528 
0.0001
7 
1.48776 0.164911 
 Intercept -9.85765 
7.1545
1 
-1.37782 0.195641 
Measure 
Values 
Quarter 
Wells  
Fargo 
< 0.0001 11 Quarter -0.0003773 
2.319e-
05 
-16.2687 < 0.0001 
 Intercept 17.2421 
0.9764
13 
17.6586 < 0.0001 
Measure 
Values 
Quarter 
Bank of  
America 
0.00611
88 
11 Quarter 0.0006105 
0.0001
805 
3.38219 0.0061188 
 Intercept -25.1811 
7.5987
4 
-3.31385 0.0069062 
Measure 
Values 
Quarter 
JP  
Morgan 
0.00298
26 
11 Quarter 0.0001461 
3.853e-
05 
3.79233 0.0029826 
 Intercept -5.21217 
1.6219
1 
-3.2136 0.0082526 
Model formula: Measure Names*( Quarter + Intercept ) 
Number of modeled observations: 65 
Number of filtered observations: 15 
Model degrees of freedom: 10 
Residual degrees of freedom (DF): 55 
SSE (sum squared error): 1.38226 
MSE (mean squared error): 0.0251321 
R-Squared: 0.808293 
Standard error: 0.158531 
p-value (significance): < 0.0001 
  
 
56 
Appendix C 
Bank Holding Company Trading Asset Statistical Regression Model 
	
Trend Lines Model 
A linear trend model is 
computed for Measure 
Values given Quarter. The 
model may be significant 
at p <= 0.05. The factor 
Measure Names may be 
significant at p <= 0.05. 
 
	
Analysis of	Variance:	
 
Field DF SSE MSE F p-value 
Measure Names 8 8.8000518e+17 1.10001e+17 801.599 < 0.0001 
 
Individual Trend Lines: 
 
Panes Color Line Coefficients 
Row Column 
Measure 
Names 
p-value DF Term Value StdErr t-value p-value 
Measure 
Values 
Quarter 
Goldman 
Sachs 
< 0.0001 14 Quarter -75108.6 6655.14 -11.2858 < 0.0001 
 Intercept 
3.47069e+
09 
2.79255
e+08 
12.4284 < 0.0001 
Measure 
Values 
Quarter Citigroup 
0.00015
15 
14 Quarter -35473.4 6907.78 -5.13529 0.0001515 
 Intercept 
1.76973e+
09 
2.89856
e+08 
6.10555 < 0.0001 
Measure 
Values 
Quarter 
Wells  
Fargo 
< 0.0001 14 Quarter 18945 2386.58 7.93812 < 0.0001 
 Intercept -7.222e+08 
1.00143
e+08 
-7.21265 < 0.0001 
Measure 
Values 
Quarter 
Bank of  
America 
< 0.0001 14 Quarter -38324.9 5913.27 -6.48118 < 0.0001 
 Intercept 
1.87765e+
09 
2.48126
e+08 
7.56733 < 0.0001 
Measure 
Values 
Quarter 
JP  
Morgan 
0.01654
39 
14 Quarter -28473.9 10462.5 -2.72153 0.0165439 
 Intercept 
1.57787e+
09 
4.39015
e+08 
3.59413 0.0029325 
Model formula: Measure Names*( Quarter + Intercept ) 
Number of modeled observations: 80 
Number of filtered observations: 0 
Model degrees of freedom: 10 
Residual degrees of freedom (DF): 70 
SSE (sum squared error): 9.60586e+15 
MSE (mean squared error): 1.37227e+14 
R-Squared: 0.989372 
Standard error: 1.17144e+07 
p-value (significance): < 0.0001 
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Appendix D 
Quarterly Percentage Change in Bank Holding Company Trading Assets 
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Appendix E 
Ratio of Interest Rate Derivative Contracts Held for Trading to  
Interest Rate Derivative Contracts Held for Purposes Other than Trading 
 
 
 JP Morgan Bank of America Wells Fargo Citigroup Goldman Sachs 
2013 Q1 90.23 29.43 6.80 581.05 271.58 
2013 Q2 83.44 26.22 7.28 675.94 281.33 
2013 Q3 98.94 25.06 9.36 1162.18 297.66 
2013 Q4 100.02 22.18 12.03 818.33 332.08 
2014 Q1 116.86 32.18 12.67 812.91 345.11 
2014 Q2 121.50 39.20 11.90 529.79 383.74 
2014 Q3 100.82 40.14 11.01 620.21 391.64 
2014 Q4 82.66 32.58 11.36 1252.77 349.35 
2015 Q1 83.98 33.45 11.48 1161.45 339.61 
2015 Q2 183.17 32.57 11.64 1014.70 327.77 
2015 Q3 174.60 29.82 12.56 1044.81 328.89 
2015 Q4 100.56 42.98 11.16 911.51 302.63 
2016 Q1 94.11 48.53 10.59 978.90 347.42 
2016 Q2 123.17 55.81 11.36 860.95 376.35 
2016 Q3 120.07 49.13 11.27 787.70 340.05 
2016 Q4 112.92 45.11 12.45 712.85 324.91 
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